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Abstract:
Some commentators argue that private religious schools are less likely to inculcate the attributes
of good citizenship than traditional public schools (Gutmann, 1999), specifically proposing that
private Islamic schools are relatively more likely to produce individuals sympathetic to terrorism
(Stotsky, 2011). This study offers a preliminary examination of the question by studying the
educational backgrounds of Western educated terrorists. While data are limited, in accord with
prior work (Bergen & Pandey, 2005) findings indicate the vast majority of both Islamic and
reactionary terrorists attended traditional public schools and had no religious education; hence
findings suggest that early religious training and identification may actually encourage prosocial
behavior.
Keywords: terrorism, public schools, private schools, school choice, Islam, madrasa, Muslim,
jihadist, right wing, homegrown terrorists.
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With regards to three dimensions (reflection, skills, and attitudes) pupils at Islamic schools score
considerably higher than pupils at comparable schools, and still higher than pupils at the
average school. Only with regard to knowledge competence do pupils at Islamic schools score
nearly the same as pupils at comparable schools, but significantly lower than pupils at the
average school. These findings directly challenge the assumption that pupils at Islamic schools
are less likely to cultivate the relevant civic virtues for Dutch society at large. Jaap Dronkers,
2016, pp. 14-15.
The late, eminent sociologist Jaap Dronkers possessed an impressive set of academic
skills and virtues (Wolf, 2016). He delved, courageously, into controversial topics with an open
mind and an incisive set of analytic tools. The fruits of his scholarship included his pioneering
study of the civic skills and attitudes of students in private Islamic schools in The Netherlands,
published just before his untimely death. Contrary to popular belief, Dronkers concluded, Dutch
Islamic schools appeared to be doing a good job of preparing students to be law-abiding,
democratic citizens (Dronkers, 2016). In this article, we examine whether Dronkers’ findings
regarding Dutch private schools and civic values appear to apply to the U.S. context and the most
un-civic of behaviors: terrorism.
Despite the considerable media and law enforcement attention it draws, terrorism in the
West is rare, and typically conducted by individuals or small groups, limiting empirical analyses
(Biglan, 2015; Berman et al., 2015).1 The extant empirical work on terrorism questions
conventional wisdom about the phenomena. Pape’s profiles of modern suicide bombers as of
2003 indicate that religion was a primary motivation in only 5% of cases. Rather “suicide
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terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation rather than the product of Islamic
fundamentalism” (Pape, 2005, p. 237). Terrorism has since evolved, with an incremental rise of
Western born and raised individuals joining foreign battlefields or attempting to commit acts of
terror in their homelands. Case studies employ political environment and socioeconomic
variables to explain these individual decisions to participate in acts of terror. Possible causes of
contemporary terrorism include religious indoctrination (Hindery, 2003; Schbley, 2003) and
social and psychological alienation (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Stern, 2016). While studies try to
examine potential causal variables that may explain radicalization, the individual, social and
political variables involved are endogenous to other key variables such as religion and culture.
Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) finds that cultural homelessness and attendant alienation
among American Muslim immigrants is associated with increased support for fundamentalist
groups and extremist causes. Bhatt and Silber (2007) proposes four phases of radicalization for
the Western jihadist terrorist: 1) pre-radicalization, 2) self-identification, 3) indoctrination and 4)
jihadization. Religious education may play a role in these phases of radicalization. Often, private
Islamic schools are accused of producing individuals who commit acts of terror (Stern, 2000),
but Bergen & Pandey (2005) point out that Western jihadists largely do not attend Islamic
schools. They note, “while madrassas may breed fundamentalists who have learned to recite the
Koran in Arabic by rote, such schools do not teach the technical or linguistic skills necessary to
be an effective terrorist.” (Bergen & Pandey, 2005, p. A23) Out of the 75 profiles of terrorists
who attacked Western targets, only nine had attended madrasas. Their study did not parse out
the data between homegrown vs. foreign terrorists and by schooling type, probably due to small
sample size.
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Few Western terrorists majored in religion during their religious studies (Gambetta, &
Hertog, 2016). Classic work by Hoffer (1951) shows how radicals differ from the rest of society.
Since many commentators see religious schooling as a form of indoctrination (Dawkins, 2006;
Harris, 2011; Americans United, 2011), it is important to examine possible relationships between
religious schooling and terrorism.
The purpose of this study is to offer a preliminary exploration of whether religious
schooling in general and Islamic schooling in particular is associated with participation in
terrorism. American government and international aid agencies have funded programs to
strengthen the educational effectiveness of public schools, but not religious schools, in majorityMuslim nations since September 11, 2001. Efforts to reduce terrorism by replacing religious
schools with public schools may be counter-productive. Experimental and quasi-experimental
studies in the United States and Europe indicate that private school choice interventions tend to
produce positive outcomes for civic values (Wolf, 2007; Forster, 2016), or at least do no harm in
that area (Dronkers, 2004; Carlson, Chingos & Campbell, 2017). Thus, carefully designed school
choice interventions may decrease terrorism by reducing the numbers of young recruits who
attempt to commit violent acts.
To explore the possibility that religious schooling might not be causing, and in fact might
be hindering, terrorism, this article analyzes the schooling of native born Americans who
succeeded in committing an act of terror inside the United States. We first outline the role of
quality instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic tradition, culture, and
values in discouraging terrorism, as well as the role of independent religious schools in
delivering such instruction. The paper argues that decentralized and market based schooling
better facilitates tolerance in comparison to centralized and government controlled schooling
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(Berner, 2017; Coulson, 1999; Friedman, 2002; Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012). We suggest
that religious extremism and recently Islamic extremism is a byproduct of the lack of access to
quality religious education, government hindrance of school choice and the lack of pluralism in
public schooling and not necessarily caused by religious schooling. We use the coding of
historical cases and summary statistics to support our claims. This preliminary analysis suggests
that school choice interventions may, over the long term, reduce the incidence of terrorism in
Western societies.
Contextual history and theory of Islamic schooling and organization
Five framing considerations are vital to our exploratory study. First, Islam has a long and
storied educational tradition that mainly has been privately operated and decentralized. Second,
the major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia, are distinct in ways that inform our consideration of
private school choice and terrorism. Third, traditionalism and fundamentalism is a second
distinction within Islam that is largely independent of the Sunni-Shia divide. Fourth, a lack of
exposure to high-quality religious instruction appears to be contributing to the modern terrorist
activity of some Muslims. Fifth, high-quality Islamic religious instruction in the West is likely to
be fostered by a system of private Islamic schools financially supported and partially overseen by
government.
Islamic schooling tradition
Up to the eleventh century, Islamic schooling was primarily self-funded and
philanthropic. Schooling in mosques and in the madrasas took place free of government
intervention. Egger (2004, p. 220) notes “[t]he madrasa never displaced the mosque as an
educational institution. In fact, Muslims were never precise in distinguishing between the two,
because education and worship took place in both.” This period is often remembered as the
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golden age of Islam due to its high scholarly accomplishment and education attainment.
Increased state intervention in schooling starting in the eleventh century occurred
contemporaneously with a decline in Islamic scholarship and reduced tolerance of minorities,
perhaps reflecting regime goals superseding religious goals. Decentralization and a market
orientation were the key attributes of Islamic schooling up to that time (Coulson, 1999; Durrant,
1950, p. 94, 304).
The Sunni-Shia distinction
Religious tradition is often complicated. Much of Sunni Islam is decentralized whereas
Shia Islam is essentially centralized. This distinction has important implications. The violent
extremists of Sunni Islam become self-empowered and interpret Islam in ways that justify their
values and actions (Gambetta, & Hertog, 2016). Sunni extremists practice violence horizontally
while Shia extremists do so vertically, meaning that the former harm fellow religious comrades
and declare them as apostates while the latter target ‘perceived opponents.’ By every count AlQaeda, Taliban, ISIS and other Sunni terrorist organizations have killed far more Sunni Muslims
than other groups have done. On the other hand, Shia Militias seldom attack their co-religionists,
largely because Shia central authorities (Ayatollahs) must authorize such violent acts.
Islamic traditionalism versus fundamentalism
The divide between Islamic traditionalism and fundamentalism is central to the schooling
and terrorism story. Traditionalism involves following the four jurisprudential schools of thought
in Sunni Islam of Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Maliki. Fundamentalism rejects these established
theological practices and often goes against the theological consensus of the traditionalist
interpretations, called the ijma. Traditionalists are less likely than fundamentalists to get involved
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in terrorism as traditionalists are influenced by historic institutions, scholarly consensus and a
variation in interpretation of religious texts, all of which possess market attributes.
Traditionalists view family and civic values as highly salient, while these commitments
tend to be weaker for fundamentalists. Literal interpretation of the text of The Quran is central to
the fundamentalist doctrines of Salafism and Wahhabism (Hill, Knitter, & Madges, 1997).
Fundamentalism lacks mass appeal, but in societies where socio-economic and political vacuums
exist, fundamentalism has gained legitimacy. Almost all major Sunni terrorist organizations
identify their ideology as fundamentalist (Salafism or Wahhabism). In the theological sense,
Sunni fundamentalism confronts the theological consensus of traditionalist Muslim scholars and
jurists. The majority of Islamic fundamentalists do not practice violence yet the correlation
between fundamentalism and violence is strong. We now focus on the possibility that quality
Islamic instruction could moderate the trail to terror for Sunni fundamentalists that form the
majority.
Quality instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic tradition, culture, and
values
Growing numbers of new converts to Islam have suddenly joined jihad. Ten to 25 percent
of terrorists are Western converts to Islam, including approximately 30 percent of American
jihadists, a remarkably high percentage given their very small numbers (Roy, 2008; New
America, 2017). While most life-long Muslims have received a substantial amount of religious
instruction in their mosques and schools, converts to Islam lack depth to their Islamic training
due to a general lack of exposure to quality Islamic instruction.
This article defines quality Islamic instruction as grounded in an authentic understanding
of Islamic tradition, culture, and values. High quality instruction, regardless of topic, promotes
cognitive outcomes like educational achievement and attainment and also non-cognitive
7

outcomes like grit and perseverance. For example, Dutch Islamic schools outperform comparison
schools in improving student non-cognitive skills on three dimensions: reflections, skills, and
civic attitudes and have a positive effect on student cognitive outcomes after controlling for
student socio-economic background (Dronkers, 2016).
A lack of quality religious instruction grounded in an authentic understanding of Islamic
tradition, culture, and values appears to contribute to terrorist activity. Most Western terror
recruiters and the individuals who commit terror are less likely to know classical Arabic or be
trained in traditional Islamic sciences2 and thus lack the authority to issue a fatwa3 (Kareem,
2014; Oakford, 2014). In lieu of quality Islamic instruction, the typical Islamic consumer may
not be able to distinguish between the opportunity cost of choosing the religious signal from a
traditionalist who opposes terrorism over that of a fundamentalist who condones or encourages
it.
Many Muslim youth in the West lack a religious identity, as they neither attend mosque
nor vigorously nurture a strong religious identity (Haddad & Lummis, 1987; Smith, 2000).
Qualitative work in Islamic schools shows that children draw upon Islamic education for their
identity and to give their life meaning (Driessen, & Valkenberg, 2000; Hussain, & Read, 2015;
Mohme, 2017; Smith, 2000; Zine, 2006). Lack of access to quality & overtly religious schooling
is thus not a boon but a bane for promoting civic values (Berner, 2017). The traditional public
schools are often large, bureaucratic, and lack religious and other values. Hence, they leave

2

Traditional Islamic sciences include Islamic jurisprudence and its methodology primarily based on the Quran and
the traditions of the prophet of Islam. Islamic sciences differ from western sciences as the former are laid around
revealed Islamic texts and spirituality. Worship forms the core of the former while for the latter acquiring material
knowledge is the main motivation.
3
Literal meaning is Islamic opinion (it takes the form of a verdict when issued by a jurist). In Western democracies,
a fatwa is often a non-binding Islamic verdict issued by an influential religious authority.
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young people hungry for meaning (Berner, 2017; Chubb, & Moe, 1990; Powell, Farrar, &
Cohen, 1985).
Western Islam seeks to be in accord with modernity. Almost all Western mosques
welcome Muslims of both genders. The challenge for Islam, however, is that new converts to the
faith and the current generation of Muslims coming of age in the West often lack access to
quality instruction to communicate the theological depth, diversity, traditions, and values of
Islam. The social and purposive needs of Muslims, especially if they are young or converts to the
religion, may be better addressed through private schools of choice, as market oriented
organizations are better at dispensing incentives to individuals to prompt them to contribute
activity to collective enterprises (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Under school choice systems,
consumers are able to maximize their religious, spiritual and cultural utility by their choice of a
school for their child. Such programs operate under the purview of the legal and democratic
process (Wolf & Macedo, 2004; Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012; Mohme, 2017).
Role of independent religious schools
Limited local access to quality religious instruction creates a bad market for the potential
Islamic consumer. The problem concerning religious extremism and Islam, we contend, can be
thought of as an example of market failure. The market for Islamic religious instruction in most
parts of the world arguably is suffering from a lack of four key market components: (1) quality
options, (2) variation in theological instruction, (3) operational autonomy from the state, and (4)
competition among religious institutions based on observable outcomes. Increases in the delivery
of education specifically through government schooling reduces the variance in Islamic
theological instruction by reducing the size of the market for religious schools. State intervention
in religious institutions also gives rise to special interest groups, which, if fundamentalist,
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become a source for the government to stay in power. Consequently, fundamentalism gains
influence in the absence of local quality options, as we have seen recently in Iran, Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan.
Religious education is handled, broadly, in three different ways across countries (Wolf &
Macedo, 2004; Glenn, De Groof & Candal, 2012). In most nation-states, religious schools
operate entirely in the private sector, with no subsidies and little involvement from government.
Some countries, from the Middle East to Great Britain, provide faith based religious instruction
in government-run public schools. For political reasons such as regime maintenance, these
governments influence the instruction in religious schools. Finally, many Western countries
permit private religious schools to receive government subsidies to support the education of
students that choose to attend such schools (Dronkers & Robert, 2008). Even though the
government regulation of religious schools under private school choice systems ranges from
minimal to only moderate at most (Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012), a substantial amount of
research shows that private school choice contributes to civic values and tolerance, and no
evidence indicates that civic attitudes and social cohesion degrades due to school choice (Greene,
1998; Dronkers, 2004; Wolf, 2008; Shafiq & Myers, 2014; Carlson, Chingos, &Campbell,
2017).
Religious schools might be more apt to promote civic values as they cater to the spiritual
development of the soul and encourage stronger family ties. Wolf (2008, p. 487) says “[t]his
seems to be the case particularly among ethnic minorities (such as Latinos) in places with great
ethnic diversity (such as New York City and Texas), and when Catholic schools are the schools
of choice.” The overlap of education and religion is not new to the Western democracies and the
local churches played a role in the original American public schools. Ironically, while America
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denies the role of religion in its public schools, many European democracies have embraced
school choice that includes state-funded religious schools (Berner, 2017; Maranto & van
Raemdonck, 2015).
As private schools, we contend that religious schools are best accountable to consumers
in the form of parents and not to the government. Chubb and Moe (1990) develop the likely
superiority of consumer rather than state driven schooling. They argue that institutional reform is
the key to better schools and an indirect control of the schools through markets and parental
choice is the best hope for educational effectiveness.
Numerous studies done on private schools have established that religious schooling
contributes to civic values and practices much more strongly than public schooling (DeAngelis
& Wolf, 2016; Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Mills & Wolf, 2016). Dronkers (2016) shows that
Dutch Islamic schools not only have a positive value added for student achievement after
controlling for socio-economic background, but also the schools do well on non-cognitive
measures. Merry and Driessen (2016) report that in 2002, the Dutch Education Inspectorate
concluded that 90% of the Islamic schools were aiding the process of integration of Muslims in
Dutch society. Abernathy (2005) notes that increased competition due to school choice affected
the voting behavior for the state of New Jersey. Basford and Traeger (2014) have shown Somali
students adapted to civic values and expressed a greater acceptance of American society in the
ethnocentric charter schools in Minneapolis, consistent with similar findings for Somalis in the
private school choice environment of Sweden (Mohme, 2017). Catholic schooling in the U.S. has
contributed to successful integration in society (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). Catholic schools
enroll growing number of non-Catholic and minority students (McDonald, 2000) and produce
equal or better civic outcomes than traditional public schools (Wolf, 2007; Berner, 2017). The

11

relatively new Islamic schools in the U.S. are likely to contribute towards the common good in a
similar fashion to the relatively older Catholic schools. Thus, a deep grounding in one’s faith and
religious community through Islamic schooling can in fact facilitate successful assimilation
within a largely secular society. We argue this holds for Islamic schools in the cultural West.
In contrast, state control or state influence in religious schools has a history of promoting
intolerance when compared to decentralized and privately administered religious schools. There
are far fewer fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields from India, which is home to the thirdlargest population of Muslims,4 than from other Muslim and Western countries. Concerning the
ongoing wars in Iraq and Syria, calculations5 for number of foreign fighters per million people
by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence do not list
India. This is not to say that few Indian Muslims have not gone overseas to join the terrorist
organizations, but their representation is least after taking the Indian Muslim population’s size
and India’s history of religious conflicts in account. India’s religious schools are largely free of
government control and the Islamic religious institutions (madrasas6) in India have strongly
protested any government attempt to bring the religious institutions under its control.
Conditions differ where the state regulates religious schools to promote particular
religious schooling for regime support. There could be objections to this hypothesis that the geopolitics of the countries are different, however, none other than Al-Qaeda expressed frustration
with this by releasing a video entitled ‘Why is there no storm in your river?’ (Ahmad, 2013). AlQaeda’s frustration with Indian Muslims has continued to grow till today.7 The Syrian and Iraqi

Hackett (2015) says that by 2050, Indian will have world’s largest population of Muslims.
http://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html
6
Islamic schools, mostly prevalent in parts of Asia and Africa.
7
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/zakir-musa-slams-indian-muslims-for-not-joining-jihad-calls-themworlds-most-shameless/articleshow/59010014.cms
4
5
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battlefield has more fighters from Western nations both in numbers and in proportion to their
Muslim population than from many Muslim majority nations. Weaver (2015) says “More British
Muslims have joined Islamist militant groups than serve in the country’s armed forces.”
Sociology should address why Indian Muslims, who arguably have genuine grievances, join
foreign battlefields in far lower proportions than Pakistani, Saudi, and Western raised
individuals. A potential explanation is the existence of state-independent madrasas in India,
which provide the Muslims with stakes in the system and thus reduce radicalization and
terrorism.
In summary, observers may be incorrect in ascribing the trail to terror to Islamic religious
schools. The assumption that public schools promote tolerance and private religious schools
promote intolerance should be empirically tested. An important arena in which to test this claim
is regarding the most intolerant of acts: terrorism in the cultural West. Islamic schools operating
independently in choice-based educational markets need to please parents, who, after all, do not
want their children to become terrorists. State support for authentic Islamic religious schools in
the West could provide the instruction for young Muslims truer to the Muslim faith and less
critical of the West because it would be transparent and subject to public scrutiny. O’Neill (2010,
p. 68) notes that a majority of Islamic schools in the U.S. are governed independently of local
mosques. Independent religious schools, supported by the state, could be a highly effective antiterrorism vehicle in the cultural West. We think that the evidence from terrorist activities to date
provide empirical support for our claim.
Data
This section describes the data sources for testing if religious and specifically Islamic
schooling is associated with successful cases of homegrown terror or not. Before beginning the
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project, we contacted major experts in the area to get their views on the question of private
schooling and western terrorists. The views by Robert Pape at the University of Chicago,
Thomas Hegghammer at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Diego Gambetta at
European University Institute, Joshua Freilich at The City University of New York and Brent
Smith at the University of Arkansas were constructive. The New America Foundation provided
the complete list of fatal jihadist and right wing attacks since 9/11. Databases like The National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of
Maryland were also searched to see if they collected information on the educational background
of terrorists. Freilich et al. (2014) provided useful data which was crosschecked with the other
sources. Mueller (2013) included individual case studies which helped us trace the history of
western terrorists. Internet searches were used to fill some data gaps. We combined all of this
information into a single database of the educational and backgrounds of all western terrorists
since 9/11. To the best of our knowledge, our database is the first to codify information on all
levels and types of schooling of western terrorists. We then used the database to test the claim
that private religious schooling promotes terrorist activity.
Research Design
The study is based on collecting the high school profile of individuals raised in the West
who successfully committed acts of terror on the western soil. The article does not delve into
questions of foreign and domestic politics or religion and ideology since they have been studied
elsewhere, as described in the framing sections above. This study focuses on the single vital
question of the association between private education and extreme intolerance in the form of
terrorism.
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Although our analysis is confined to acts of terror in the U.S., we discuss some European
terror events to explore the external validity of our findings. We focus our research on the U.S.
because:
1)

It does not share a border with countries that directly suffer terror or insurgency, so terrorist
infiltration is of little concern (Laqueur, 2016).

2)

It does not have a territorial dispute that is tied to acts of terror.

3)

It is not known to have inflicted state sponsored violence on citizens in the post-Soviet era.8

4)

It is economically prosperous and defends many individual liberties, so individuals born
and raised in the U.S. have few obvious motivations to commit acts of terrorism.

Indeed, Francis Fukuyama (1992), in The End of History and the Last Man, claimed there existed
a consensus that the West had discovered the formula for societal success. All countries,
according to Fukuyama, would soon evolve toward the model of capitalist democracy common
in North American, Europe, the much of Asia. Until quite recently, with the notable exception of
the IRA and Basque separatists in Spain, domestic terrorism was almost non-existent in the west.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined systematically the
educational background of Western born terrorists. As a preliminary analysis, we focus only on
the high school level of education, recording attendance at public or private schools. Data for
schooling of all the terrorists at all levels from K-12 is not available. A lack of control variables
measuring non-schooling factors that could influence terrorist activity means that our analysis is
merely exploratory and not causal. Although even a single act of terror is a regrettable horror,

8 We

have thus excluded South Asia, China, Russia, Middle East, South East Asia and Northern Africa and other
regions.

15

from a statistical sense, the sample of people who have committed terrorist acts in the U.S. since
9/11 is small. Future associations between private schooling and terrorist activity might be
different should additional acts take place that diverge from the pattern we describe here.
The terrorists analyzed in this paper are limited to those born and raised in the U.S., with
right-wing affiliations, who actually managed to commit an act of terror. We limit our study to
right-wing terrorists because Jihadist ideology is a politically conservative form of extremism
(Lee, 2011). For example, Ismaaiyl Brinsley9 may have been inspired by Black Lives Matter but
we exclude his case because BLM does not advocate violence and is not politically conservative.
Similarly John Allen Muhammad, the “Beltway sniper”, was a U.S.-born Muslim who spread
terror but his purpose was to kill his ex-wife in order to gain custody of their children. The
terrorism he engaged in was instrumental to making his wife’s murder look like a terrorist act, so
we exclude him. Naveed Afzal Haq clearly committed an act of terror but his prior actions
include arrest for public exposure and other behaviors that suggest mental illness, and not rightwing ideology, motivated him to commit terror. Finally, we exclude cases such as Alton Nolen in
Oklahoma where the possible terrorist was accused but never legally charged with a terror-linked
crime.10 One takeaway from the data below is that there really are not very many actual
successful U.S. born and raised ideologically motivated Muslim terrorists, certainly not
compared to Europe. But are private Islamic schools associated with the few terrorists who have
emerged from the American Muslim community over the past 16 years? That is our question
here.
Consistent with the principles of Bayesian inference (Edwards, Lindman & Savage,
1963), we first determine the percentage of Muslims in the U.S. who attend private high schools

9

Information available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201412200060
Information available at http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/terror-plot.html?id=1793

10

16

to find an empirical basis for an increased likelihood of a U.S. Muslim committing terrorism due
to attending private Islamic schools. Then we compare that likelihood of having attended a
private high school, given that a person is an American Muslim, with the likelihood of them
having been privately educated, given that they committed a terrorist act.
Results
We conduct separate analyses of explicitly jihadist terrorists (table 1 A) and non-jihadist
right-wing terrorists (table 1 B). Out of the twelve profiles of jihadist terrorists, we could collect
educational data on only seven. For the thirty-three profiles of right-wing non-jihadist terrorists,
we could collect educational data for only fifteen. All seven jihadist individuals are males who
attended public schools. Of the fifteen right-wing non-jihadist terrorists for which we were able
to obtain data, eleven attended public schools, three attended private schools, and one was
homeschooled.
[table 1 A about here]
[table 1 B about here]
To determine if these limited associations between private schooling and terrorism
suggest a connection between the two, we consult data on private school attendance in general
and private Islamic school attendance in particular. In 2013-2014, 208 private Islamic schools in
the U.S. enrolled 35,295 students (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017a). A total of
4,097 students were enrolled in Islamic high schools that year, representing just .03 percent of
the 15.3 million secondary school students that year, as most Islamic schools in the U.S. end at
grade 8 (Keyworth, 2006). O’Neill (2010, p. 5) reports that only three percent of American
Muslims attend private Islamic schools. Since approximately ten percent of high school students
in the U.S. attend private schools (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017b), the
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likelihood of a Muslim attending a private Islamic school is lower than the general likelihood of
private school attendance. Given that a U.S. born adult is a Muslim, there is a 3 percent chance
that he attended a private school. Given that a U.S. born adult is a Muslim terrorist, there is a 0
percent chance that he attended a private high school. Thus, although the actual educational
histories of seven Muslim terrorists do not support the claim that private Islamic schools
encourage people to commit terrorist acts, they also do not necessarily support the claim that
private Islamic schools discourage people from becoming terrorists. It is possible that the main
reason why no U.S. Muslim terrorists have been privately educated is because so few U.S.
Muslims attend private Islamic schools.
The evidence regarding non-jihadist right-wing terrorists is similarly inconclusive. Given
that a person is a U.S. born adult, there is a 10 percent chance that he attended a private high
school. Given that a U.S. born adult is a right-wing terrorist, there is a 20 percent chance that he
attended a private high school. Although private school attendance is associated with a higher
likelihood of having committed a right-wing terrorist act, with only 15 cases to draw from, this
preliminary analysis is only suggestive of such a link.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
With limited data, this analysis indicates that there is lack of empirical basis to claim that
religious and specifically Islamic schooling in the United States is associated with homegrown
terrorism. Among the U.S.-raised Muslims charged with committing or attempting to commit
acts of terrorism in the west, all for whom we have data attended traditional public schools.
There is an interesting historical analogy, in that in the 19th and early 20th Century American
Catholic schools were seen as divisive to the polity. In fact, as the past 30 years of research has
shown, Catholic schools seem to increase rather than decrease patriotism, civic activity,
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tolerance as well as effectiveness (Bryk, Lee & Holland, 1993; Manno & Graham, 2001;
Campbell, 2008). The same could be true of Muslim schools in the U.S.; however, their current
small scale provides little evidence at this point to confirm that possibility.
Greater access to religious schooling may benefit the society and religious schooling may
moderate the frequency of acts of terror in the West. A key recommendation for policy makers is
to encourage decentralized and private school choice and evaluation of Islamic schools based on
measurable outcomes. This recommendation is especially acute as Muslim nations suffer from
bad governance, unpopular regimes, restless and uneducated youth (Hackett et al., 2016; Ummid
news, 2015). Decentralized and private religious schooling could moderate the causal link
between hate and violence in the form of terrorism. Local quality Islamic education and the
higher education of Imams of mosques in U.S. universities may also promote tolerance among
Muslims. A lack of quality local schooling options in the Middle East have increased the role of
Saudi Salafi and Wahhabi Islam funded by petrodollars. A market oriented approach to Islamic
schooling can increase adherence to the traditional approach to Islam and weaken
fundamentalism. Government can aide this process through greater access to private religious
schools. An alternate approach is to also provide religious instruction in existing public schools;
this may increase the plurality of public education that may add to creating democratic citizens
(Berner, 2017). In many cases it could be possible that the marginal terrorist can be brought back
to sanity if his or her spiritual and social needs can be met through religious schooling.
School choice has the potential to serve disadvantaged minorities better than public
schools (Tooley, 2009; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Howell & Peterson, 2006). In
religious private schools, students from other religions and cultures self-select for a better quality
of education, generating social and religious diversity within such private schools (Trivitt &
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Wolf, 2011). It is surprising to know that this doesn’t only happen in affluent Catholic schools in
some countries outside the U.S. but also in some of the not so affluent Islamic schools in India
which Hindu students self-select into for educational needs (Al Jazeera English, 2013). This
shows that the market produces more options for diversity and acceptance by choice. The
schools created for the disadvantaged minorities in a free-market would be open to everyone.
The decision to create a school for minorities would again be based on consumer demand and not
regime goals that might be antithetical to political tolerance.
We acknowledge that some findings of terrorists having attended religious private
schools goes against our hypothesis that market and plural education is better than a statist
approach to education. However, as mere attendance at a public school does not make one a
democratic citizen, mere attendance at a religious school does not make one a fundamentalist or
terrorist. Further research is need for the few cases where terrorists attended religious schools to
see if religious values were in fact translated to these individuals at the schools. Additionally,
researchers need to examine if terrorists built a socio-religious identity due to their religious
schooling that then led them strike at their fellow citizens with terrorism. We hypothesize they
did not.
This study aims to encourage further research into the education profiles of people who
commit violence and, secondly, calls for evaluation and proper design of Islamic curriculum in
schools which can cater to the social and spiritual needs of Muslims. Independent researchers,
child psychologists, trained religious instructors and sociologists should build upon the
pioneering work of Jaap Dronkers in this field. To support such research, government agencies
should produce more detailed and comprehensive databases regarding the backgrounds of people
who commit terrorist acts. We drew from multiple data sources for this study and still only
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obtained the evidence that we needed from about half of the cases that could have been included
in the study.
We think there is good reason to believe that providing increased access to modern
Islamic schooling in the U.S. would address the spiritual and religious needs of Muslim students.
Providing people with a stake in society through a system of school choice can be a way to
moderate any inclination towards terrorism. We look forward to more research on this vital topic.

21

References
Abernathy, S. F. (2005). School choice and the future of American democracy. University of
Michigan Press.
Ahmad, T. (2013). (2013, June 27). Al-Qaeda’s India dilemma. The New Indian Express.
Retreived from http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Al-Qaedas-Indiadilemma/2013/06/27/article1654347.ece
Al Jazeera English. (2013). Madrassas in India Attract Hindu Students. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/indiaonline/2013/11/madrassas-india-attracthindu-students-2013111814457229891.html
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. (2011). 10 reasons why private school
vouchers should be rejected. Retrieved from https://www.au.org/church-state/february2011-church-state/featured/10-reasons-why-private-school-vouchers-should-be.
Basford, L. E. & Traeger, H. M. (2014). A Somali school in Minneapolis. In Fox, R. A., &
Buchanan, N. K. (Eds.). Proud to be different: Ethnocentric niche charter schools in
America. R&L Education.
Bergen, P. & Pandey, S. (2005, June 14). The madrassa myth. New York Times.
Berman, E., Felter, J., Kapstein, E. B. & Shapiro, J. (2015, March 16). How empirical studies of
political violence (can) help policymakers. Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/how-empiricalstudies-of-political-violence-can-help-policymakers/
Berner, A. R. (2017). Pluralism and American public education: No one way to school. Springer.

22

Bettinger, E., & Slonim, R. (2006). Using experimental economics to measure the effects of a
natural educational experiment on altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8), 16251648.
Bhatt, A., & Silber, M. D. (2007). Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat. New York:
New York City Police Department.
Biglan, A. (2015, March 8). Where terrorism research goes wrong. The New York Times, p.
SR12. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/whereterrorism-research-went-wrong.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=MothVisible&module=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nytregion&assetType=opinion&_r=1
Bryk, A. S., Lee, V. E., & Holland, P. B. (1993). Catholic schools and the common good.
Harvard University Press.
Campbell, D. E. (2008). Civic side of school choice: An empirical analysis of civic education in
public and private schools, The. BYU L. Rev., 487.
Carlson, D., Chingos, M.M., & Campbell, D.E. (2017). The effect of private school vouchers on
political participation: Experimental evidence from New York City. Journal of Research
on Educational Effectiveness, 10(3), 545-569.
Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). America's public schools: Choice is a panacea. The
Brookings Review, 8(3), 4-12.
Clark, P. B., & Wilson, J. Q. (1961). Incentive systems: A theory of organizations.
Administrative science quarterly, 129-166.
Coulson, A. J. (1999). Market education: The unknown history (Vol. 21). Transaction Publishers.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The god delusion. Houghton Mifflin Company.

23

DeAngelis, C., & Wolf, P. J. (2016). The school choice voucher: A 'get out of jail' card?.
Available at SSRN 2743541.
Driessen, G., & Valkenberg, P. (2000). Islamic schools in the Netherlands: compromising
between identity and quality?. British Journal of Religious Education, 23(1), 15-26.
Dronkers, J. (2004). Do public and religious schools really differ? Assessing the European
evidence. In Wolf, P. J., & Macedo, S. (Eds.), Educating citizens: International
perspectives on civic values and school choice (287-312). Brookings Institution Press.
Dronkers, J., & Robert, P. (2008). Differences in scholastic achievement of public, private
government-dependent, and private independent schools: A cross-national analysis.
Educational Policy, 22(4), 541-577.
Dronkers, J. (2016). Islamic primary schools in The Netherlands. Journal of School Choice,
10(1), 6-21.
Durant, W. (1950). The age of faith: A history of Medieval Civilization-Christian, Islamic, and
Judaic-from Constantine to Dante: AD 325-1300. The Story of Civilization, Part Four.
Simon & Schuster.
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., & Savage, L.J. (1963). Bayesian statistical inference for
psychological research. Psychological Review, 70, 193-242.
Forster, G. (2016). A win-win solution: The empirical evidence on school choice. Indianapolis,
IN: Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice.
Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press.
Freilich, J,D., S.M. Chermak, R. Belli, J. Gruenewald, & W. Parkin. (2014). Introducing the
United States extremist crime database. Terrorism and Political Violence. 26(2): 372384.

24

Fukuyama, F. (2002). The end of history and the last man. Simon and Schuster.
Gambetta, D., & Hertog, S. (2016). Engineers of jihad: The curious connection between violent
extremism and education. Princeton University Press.
Glenn, C. L., De Groof, J., & Candal, C. S. (2012). Balancing freedom, autonomy and
accountability in education. Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP).
Greene, J. P. (1998). Civic values in public and private schools. Learning from school choice,
83-106.
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education. Princeton University Press.
Hackett, C. (2015). By 2050, India to have world’s largest populations of Hindus and Muslims.
Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/21/by-2050-india-to-have-worlds-largestpopulations-of-hindus-and-muslims/
Hackett, C., McClendon, D., Potančoková, M., & Stonawski, M. (2016). Religion and education
around the world. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/12/13/religion-and-education-around-the-world/
Haddad, Y. Y., & Lummis, A. T. (1987). Islamic values in the United States: A comparative
study. Oxford University Press, USA.
Harris, S. (2011). The moral landscape: How science can determine human values. Simon and
Schuster.
Hill, B., Knitter, P. F., & Madges, W. (1997). Faith, religion & Theology: A contemporary
introduction. Twenty-Third Publications.
Hindery, R. (2003). The anatomy of propaganda within religious terrorism. The Humanist, 63(2),
16.

25

Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of movements. New York NY:
HarperCollins.
Howell, W. G., & Peterson, P. E. (2006). The education gap: Vouchers and urban schools.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Hussain, S., & Read, J. N. G. (2015). Islamic schools in the United States and England:
Implications for integration and social cohesion. Social Compass, 62(4), 556-569.
Kareem, B. A. (2014). What we learn from ISIS list of “scholars.” Retrieved from
http://www.bilalabdulkareem.com/scholars1/
Keyworth, K. (2006). Trial by fire: Islamic schools after 9-11. Islamic Schools League of
America.
Laqueur, W. (2016). A history of terrorism: Expanded edition. Transaction Publishers.
Lee, A. (2011). Who becomes a terrorist?: Poverty, education, and the origins of political
violence. World Politics, 63, pp 203-245 doi:10.1017/S0043887111000013.
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, M. J., Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., & van Egmond, M. (2015).
Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants.
Behavioral Science & Policy, 1(2), 1-12.

Manno, B. & Graham, H. (2001). Research on Catholic school effectiveness. In Hunt, T. C.,
Joseph, E. A., & Nuzzi, R. J. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Catholic Education.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Maranto, R. & Raemdonck, D. C. V. (2015, January 8). Letting education and religion overlap.
Why expanding vouchers to include parochial schools is a good idea. The Wall Street

26

Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-maranto-and-dirk-c-vanraemdonck-letting-education-and-religion-overlap-1420761949
Merry, M. S., & Driessen, G. (2016). On the right track? Islamic schools in the Netherlands after
an era of turmoil. Race Ethnicity and Education, 19(4), 856-879.
Mills, J. N., & Wolf, P. J. (2016). The effects of the Louisiana scholarship program on student
achievement after two years. Available at SSRN 2738805.
McDonald, D. (2000). United States Catholic elementary and secondary schools 1999- 2000:
Annual statistical report on schools, enrollment and staffing. Washington, DC: National
Catholic Educational Association.
Mohme, G. (2017). Somali Swedes’ reasons for choosing a Muslim-profiled school—
Recognition and educational ambitions as important influencing factors. Journal of
School Choice, 1-19.
Mueller, J. E. (Ed.). (2013). Terrorism since 9/11: The American cases. Retrieved from
http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman. V. (2015). The aggregate effect of school choice evidence
from a two-stage experiment in India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3),
1011-1066.
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017a). Private School Survey 2013-14. Retrieved
from: https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/privateschoolsearch/.
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017b). Fast facts. Retrieved from:
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=65.
New America (2017). Part II. Who are the terrorists? Retrieved from
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/.

27

Oakford, S. (2014). Muslim scholars make the theological case against the Islamic State.
Retrieved from https://news.vice.com/article/muslim-scholars-make-the-theological-caseagainst-the-islamic-state
O'Neill, M. R. (2010). Muslim mothers: Pioneers of Islamic education in America (Doctoral
dissertation, College Of Notre Dame Of Maryland).
Pape, R. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House.
Powell, A. G., Farrar, E., & Cohen, D. K. (1985). The shopping mall high school. Winners and
losers in the educational marketplace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Roy, O. (2008). Islamic terrorist radicalisation in Europe. European Islam. Challenges for public
policy and society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 52-60.
Schbley, A. (2003). Defining religious terrorism: A causal and anthological profile. Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 26(2), 105-134.
Shafiq, M. N., & Myers, J. P. (2014). Educational vouchers and social cohesion: A statistical
analysis of student civic attitudes in Sweden, 1999–2009. American Journal of
Education, 121(1), 111-136.
Smith, J. (2000). Islam in America. New York: Colombia University Press.
Stern, J. (2000). Pakistan's Jihad culture. Foreign Affairs, 115-126.
Stern, J. (2016). Radicalization to extremism and mobilization to violence. What have we
learned and what can we do about It?. The ANNALS of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 668(1), 102-117.
Stotsky, S. (2011). The stealth curriculum. In Sarah N. Stern (eds.) Saudi Arabia and the global
Islamic terrorist network. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.

28

Tooley, J. (2009). The beautiful tree: A personal journey into how the world's poorest people are
educating themselves, Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute.
Trivitt, J., & Wolf, P.J. (2011). School choice and the branding of Catholic schools. Education
Finance and Policy, 6(2), 202-245.
Ummid news. (2015). 40% of Muslim world's population unable to read or write: Study.
Retrieved from http://www.ummid.com/news/2015/February/11.02.2015/literacy-inmuslim-world.html
Weaver, M. A. (2015, April 14). Her majesty’s jihadists. The New York Times, p. SR12.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestysjihadists.html?_r=0
Wolf, P. J., & Macedo, S. (Eds.). (2004). Educating citizens: International perspectives on civic
values and school choice. Brookings Institution Press.
Wolf, P. J. (2007). Civics exam. Education Next, 7(3). Retrieved from
http://educationnext.org/civics-exam/.
Wolf, P. J. (2008). School voucher programs: What the research says about parental school
choice. BYU L. Rev., 415.
Wolf, P. J. (2016). In tribute: Jaap Dronkers, 1945-2016. Journal of School Choice, 10(2), 137139. Retrieved from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15582159.2016.1176786.
Zine, J. (2006). Unveiled sentiments: Gendered Islamophobia and experiences of veiling among
Muslim girls in a Canadian Islamic school. Equity & Excellence in Education, 39(3),
239-252.

29

Table 1 A: Successful jihadist terror attacks committed in U.S. by U.S. born and raised
individuals since 9/11.
Category Name

Description

Jihadist

John Allen
Muhammad

Killed by suspects prior to the
spree in Washington DC

Jihadist

Joel Henry
Hinrichs III

University of Oklahoma
Bombing

2005

Public

Jihadist

Naveed
Afzal Haq

Seattle Jewish Federation
Shooting

2006

Public

Jihadist

Abdulhakim
Mujahid
Muhammad
Major Nidal
Hasan

Little Rock Shooting

2009

Public

Fort Hood Shooting

2009

Public

Jihadist

Yusuf
Ibrahim

2013

Jihadist

Ali
Muhammad
Brown
Ismaaiyl
Brinsley

Ibrahim shot and killed 25year-old Hanny Tawadros and
27-year-old Amgad Konds
after he abducted them in
February 2013 and buried
them in a shallow grave in
Atlantic County.
Washington and New Jersey
Killing Spree
shot two NYPD cops in
Brooklyn's Bed Stuy
neighborhood
Queens hatchet attack

2014

San Bernardino shooting in
California

2015

Public

La Sierra
High School

Orlando nightclub shooting

2016

Public

Martin
County High
School

Colorado Security Guard
Shooting

2017

Jihadist

Jihadist

Jihadist
Jihadist

Jihadist

Jihadist

Zale
Thompson
Syed
Rizwan
Farook
Omar Mir
Seddique
Mateen
Joshua
Cummings
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Year School
Type
Attended
2002 Public

School Name

Scotlandville
Magnet High
School
Roy J.
Wasson High
School
Richland
High School
(Washington)
Memphis’
Craigmont
High School
William
Fleming High
School

2014

2014

Note: Results are derived from basic internet searches. Cells for which data was not available
through internet searches have been left blank.

Table 1 B: Successful right wing terror attacks committed in U.S. by U.S. born and raised
individuals since 9/11.
Category

Name

Description

Year School Type School Name
Attended

Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Wade Lay

Tulsa OK, Bank
Robbery
Tulsa OK, Bank
Robbery
Knoxville, TN
Church Shooting
Brockton, MA
Murders
George Tiller
Assassination
Holocaust Museum
Shooting

2004

Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Robert
Andrew
Poplawski
Albert Robert
Gaxiola

Right
Wing

Christopher
Lay
Jim David
Adkisson
Keith Luke

2004
2008
2009

Public

2009

Public

2009

Public

Pittsburgh Police
Shootings

2009

Private

North Catholic
High School

Flores Murders,
Pima County, AZ

2009

Jason Eugene
Bush

Flores Murders,
Pima County, AZ

2009

Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Shawna Forde

2009

Andrew
Joseph Stack

Flores Murders,
Pima County, AZ
Austin, TX Plane
Attack

Private

Milton Hershey
School

Right
Wing

Raymond
Franklin Peake

Carlisle, PA
Murder

2010

Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Isaac Aguigui

Fear militia

2011

Heather
Salmon

Fear militia

2011

Scott Roeder
James Von
Brunn
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2010

Home
Schooled

Brockton High
School
Topeka High
School
JvB was educated
in public schools

Right
Wing

Anthony
Peden

Fear militia

2011

Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Christopher
Salmon
Michael
Burnett

Fear militia

2011

Fear militia

2011

Right
Wing

Wade Michael
Page

Sikh Temple
Shooting

2012

Public

Littleton High
School, Arapahoe
High School

Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Kyle David
Joekel
Holly Ann
Grigsby
David Joey
Pederson
Eric Frein

St. John's Parish
Police Ambush
Tri-State Killing
Spree
Tri-State Killing
Spree
Blooming Grove
Police Shooting

2012

Public

2012

Public

2012

Public

2012

Public

Freeman High
School
Parkrose High
School
North Salem High
School
Pocono Mountain
High School

Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing
Right
Wing

Derrick Smith

St. John's Parish
Police Ambush
Terry Smith
St. John's Parish
Police Ambush
Chanel Skains St. John's Parish
Police Ambush
Britney Keith
St. John's Parish
Police Ambush
Brian Lyn
St. John's Parish
Smith
Police Ambush
Jerad Miller
Las Vegas Police
Ambush
Amanda Miller Las Vegas Police
Ambush
Frazier Glenn
Kansas Jewish
Cross
Center Shooting
Dylann Roof
Charleston Church
Shooting
Robert Dear
Colorado Planned
Parenthood
Shooting
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2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2014

Public

2014

Public

Kennewick High
School
Jefferson High
School

2014
2015
2015

Public

White Knoll High
School

Right
James Harris
New York
2017 Private
Friends School of
Wing
Jackson
Stabbing
Baltimore
Note: Results are derived from basic internet searches. Cells for which data was not available
through internet searches have been left blank.
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